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I provide the rst estimates of tobacco price elasticity for adults in Canada's Abo-
riginal communities. I distinguish between two price eects: the direct eect, reecting
individual reaction to a price change, and the indirect eect, whereby price inuences
the individual by changing community smoking behavior. Estimates suggest a 10 per-
cent increase in price decreases daily smoking by 0.75 percentage points and occasional
smoking by 1.39 percentage points. Further, the indirect eect roughly doubles the
response to a change in tobacco prices over the direct eect alone.
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Behavioral intervention is commonly used to achieve a desired population outcome: subsidies
to encourage education; sexual awareness champagnes to avert teen pregnancy; information
champagnes and taxation to improve health. Given the prevalence of these interventions,
it is important that we understand the channels through which they inuence behavior.
Social interactions may be an important channel. Consider the eect of a tobacco tax
to discourage smoking. When social interactions are endogenous|in the sense that an
individual's smoking is positively inuenced by the smoking of others|an increase in the
price of tobacco will inuence individual smoking through two channels: directly, by making
smoking relatively more expensive, and indirectly, by decreasing community smoking rates
and therefore decreasing the marginal utility of smoking.
In this paper I analyze the inuence that price has on adult smoking in Canada's Abo-
riginal communities, explicitly accounting for the potential inuence of community smoking
rates on individual smoking behavior. I address two specic questions: Is taxation an eec-
tive tool for reducing adult tobacco use in Aboriginal communities? and, To what extent do
social interactions play a role in the observed eect of prices on smoking behavior?
Three important contributions are made to the existing literature. First, I provide sep-
arate estimates of the direct and the total eect of a tobacco tax. Endogenous social in-
teractions signicantly inuence the observed behavioral response to a change in price; the
direct eect of a price increase is half the total response for daily smoking, and one-third
for occasional smoking. Second, I estimate the eect of endogenous social interactions for
adults at the community level. I nd they are important, with a 10 percent increase in
daily smoking increasing the probability a given individual smokes by 5.6 percent. Third, I
provide the rst estimates of tobacco price elasticity for Canada's Aboriginal communities.
I nd that a 10 percent increase in prices leads to a 0.75 percentage point decrease in adult
1daily smoking, a 1.39 percentage point decrease in adult occasional smoking, and decreases
average smoking intensity among adults by 0.15 cigarettes per day. This is important for
health policy as the exemption of Aboriginal communities from provincial sales taxes, which
make up between 29 and 50 percent of the nal price on tobacco, is often cited to explain
high Aboriginal smoking rates.
Aboriginal communities in Canada provide a unique context for this type of study. Small
populations and tight knit communities mean that individuals are likely to be aware of the
conspicuous activities, such as smoking, of their fellow community members. This \reference
group" assumption is a critical component to incorporating social interactions into estima-
tion (see Manski, 1993, 2000). Unfortunately, data limitations in previous studies have not
allowed for the identication of social eects beyond a very small reference group, such as
classrooms or households (where group sizes range from 1 to 50). In contrast, my aver-
age community size is 965 individuals, and I nd a large and signicant eect from social
interactions.
My empirical strategy exploits a repeated cross section of 95 communities and 17,720 in-
dividuals created from the 1991 and 2001 waves of the Aboriginal Peoples Survey. This gives
me a rich community-level panel structure to control for unobservables. For example, I can
control for unobservable variation in preferences across communities arising from dierences
in their historical and spiritual attachment to tobacco. These data are used to estimate
three equations based on the linear-in-means model of social interactions: a baseline model
in which endogenous social interactions are assumed to be zero; a reduced form model for
which price elasticity reects the total eect; a structural model for which price elasticity
reects the direct eect. In structural estimates demographic and household characteristics
of community members are used to instrument the endogenous community smoking rates.
Cross-community variation in the change in these characteristics over time is used to identify
the structural parameters.
2Since price variation is critical, I build a set of price data that utilizes variation in
provincial tax exemptions between provinces and over time, taking careful account of the
discrepancy between tobacco prices faced in Aboriginal communities and the rest of Canada.
By doing this I capture exogenous changes in tobacco prices across these communities, while
providing the rst unied documentation of these price changes across the country. The re-
sulting price variation is large relative to previous studies estimating tobacco price elasticity,
with between period price changes (in constant dollars) as large as 40 percent.
The importance of endogenous social interactions has some broad implications. First, it
implies an important aggregation problem. When only the direct eect is known we cannot
determine the eect of a population intervention by aggregating behavior. Second, policies
that are designed to take advantage of social interactions will be more eective than policies
that focus only on individual decisions.
The literature studying social interactions and smoking has largely focused on the iden-
tication of endogenous social eects. Several studies have examined how youth smoking
is impacted by peer smoking in the same school or classroom (for example see Powell et
al. (2005), Krauth (2007), Soetevent and Kooreman (2007), and Fletcher (2010).) This
research has resulted in a range of estimated endogenous eects for youth, but it is unclear
whether these peer eects carry over to the behavior of adults. Cutler and Glaeser (2007)
nd that the probability an adult smokes increases 40 percent if their spouse smokes. When
they expand their peer group to individuals in the same metropolitan area, age cohort, and
education level there is no signicant group eect. These results may suggest that peers are
important to youth but not adult smoking.
My focus on adults in Aboriginal communities allows me to extend the literature in
several ways. Because these communities are small and secluded I am able to identify a
feasible reference group for each individual that is larger than the household or classroom,
but smaller than a metropolitan area (an average size of 965). Even with this large reference
3group I nd statistically signicant eects that are consistent with those found in smaller
peer settings. As well, my ndings suggest that the importance of social interactions on
behavior does not go away, or even diminish, in adulthood, nor do they seriously weaken in
groups of almost 1,000.
Given the public health concerns, it is not surprising that there is a large literature esti-
mating the importance of price in tobacco use outcomes. Price elasticity estimates typically
range between -0.5 and -1.7 for youth initiation (Powell et al., 2009) but are substantially
lower in adult populations. Franz (2008), for example, estimates an adult price elasticity of
-0.19 and Cutler and Glaeser (2007) nd price does not signicantly aect adult smoking.
Relatively few studies consider how estimated price elasticity is aected by endogenous social
interactions. Of those that do, Sen and Wirjanto (2009) nd that social interactions do not
signicantly impact elasticity estimates, while Auld (2005) and Powell et al. (2009) nd that
excluding controls for social interactions from the regression leads to a larger estimate of the
price elasticity. This latter nding is consistent with social interactions having a multiplier
eect on price elasticities.
A shortcoming of many studies is that the direct price elasticity (estimated by controlling
for reference group smoking) is compared to an elasticity estimated from a misspecied
model. It is not clear that, for models that exclude social interactions, the total price eect
on smoking behavior is accurately estimated. In this respect a signicant contribution is
made here. By estimating the three models outlined above I am able to account for both the
direct and indirect eects in estimating the total price elasticity. By doing this I can then
comment on how estimates from models that exclude social eects compare.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce a simple model of
tobacco demand that incorporates tobacco demand of others in the community. This model
is used to explicitly show the multiplier eect arising from endogenous social interactions. I
then discuss the empirical estimation strategy for the three proposed equations. In Section
43, I discuss the data used in the empirical estimation and provide a brief description of the
evidence supporting the underlying reference group assumption. The results of the empirical
estimation are presented in Section 4, followed by a discussion and concluding remarks in
Section 5.
2 A model of tobacco demand
In this study I think about the inuence that community smoking has on the smoking
decisions of individual community members. There are a number of reasons to think that
this is a realistic characterization of behavior. Tobacco use may be an informal mechanism
to signal social identity or group membership (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Individuals may
inform their opinions on the health consequences of smoking based on observed smoking of
others. Addicted smokers may increase the quantity of tobacco they consume, or decrease
the desire to quit, when surrounded by other smokers. Alternatively, non-smokers may be
oended by tobacco use, giving smokers incentive to reduce consumption or initiate eorts to
quit. The communities examined here are relatively small in population and have a limited
number of locations, such as recreation centers, community halls, or restaurants, for residents
to gather outside of the home. For this reason, the tobacco use an individual observes will
reect the mean tobacco use in the community.
With this in mind, individual utility from tobacco use is specied as a function of mean
tobacco use in the community. To provide a framework for thinking about how community
behavior and prices inuence smoking behavior I adopt a quasi-linear utility specication.1
The utility for individual i is given by:
U(Cigt;sigt;Egt[s]) = Cigt +







1This is similar to the utility specication used in Glaeser et al. (2003).
5Cigt and sigt are the consumption of a composite commodity and tobacco for individual i
in group g at time t. Egt[s] is the mean level of tobacco consumption in community g.
The parameter  captures the constant marginal utility from consumption of the composite
commodity to individual i. Aigt is a function of observable and unobservable determinants
of individual smoking behavior. Social interactions are captured by Egt[s], the marginal
utility of sigt attributable to mean smoking rates in the community. Therefore when mean
tobacco use in the community increases by one unit, i's marginal utility increases at the
constant rate . Following Manski (1993),  is referred to as the endogenous social eect.
Each community consists of a sucient number of individuals such that no single indi-
vidual's behavior has a signicant inuence on Egt[s], and all individuals take Egt[s] as given.
Each chooses consumption over sigt and Cigt to maximize Eq. (1) subject to their budget
constraint Cigt + Pgtsigt  Yigt, where Pgt is the real price of tobacco faced by community g
at time t, and Yigt is i's real income. Price of the composite commodity is normalized to 1.
This results in the following rst order condition (focusing on the interior solution):
sigt = Aigt + Egt[s]   Pgt (2)
This condition states that individual i will choose sigt such that the marginal benet from
consuming sigt, Aigt + Egt[s] + sigt, is equal to the marginal cost, Pgt. Notice that Pgt
reects the utility forgone by consuming Pgt fewer units of C for every unit of s.
In equilibrium all individuals choose according to Equation (2). We can solve for Egt[s]








6and substituting back into Eq. (2) to solve for the demand based on exogenous variables:
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Eq. (3) explicitly shows the two channels through which price inuences behavior when
endogenous social interactions are non-zero. The third term on the right-hand-side is the
direct eect of price on s?
igt. A unit increase in Pgt increases the marginal (utility) cost of
each unit of sigt by . The fourth term is the indirect eect of price that works through
the reference level Egt[s]. Because every individual in community g is aected by the price
increase Egt[s] declines. This creates a feedback eect as all individuals further decrease
sigt in response to the decreases in Egt[s]. The equilibrium magnitude of this indirect eect
is a =(1   ) unit decrease in s?
igt for a unit increase in price.2 The sum of these two
eects corresponds to the price coecient in (4). This highlights the previously mentioned
aggregation problem; in the presence of endogenous social interactions the eect of price on
group behavior cannot be determined by aggregating the direct eect of price on individual
behavior.
2.1 Empirical application and identication
The composite variable Aigt from Eq. (4) is specied as the sum of observable and unob-





gt + g + igt










2Notice that =(1   ) is equivalent to the innite sum  = 
P1
n=0 n.
7The 1  k vector Xigt includes exogenous characteristics specic to individual i. Igt is a
vector of observable community characteristics that impact individual tobacco preferences.
Unobserved factors that inuence preferences for tobacco are captured by g + igt, where
g is unobservable factors corresponding to the community and igt is unobservable factors
corresponding to the individual. The following assumptions are made with respect to the
distribution of unobservables: 1) g is constant over the time period under consideration;
2) conditional on Xigt and Igt, igt is independently but not identically distributed across
communities. The rst assumption means that community level xed eects can be used to
control for g. The second assumption allows that disturbances may be correlated within
communities and standard errors need to be clustered by community when estimating.
Coecients are interpreted following Manski (1993). The k  1 vector of coecients, ,
corresponds to the private eect of each exogenous variable on the cigarette consumption of
individual i. For example, an individual's age may directly impact propensity to smoke. In
addition to the endogenous social eect,  from Eq. (2), there is a second social eect, known
as the contextual eect, captured by the k  1 vector . The contextual eect captures the
inuence on individual tobacco use of observable community characteristics. For example,
living in a community with high levels of income inequality may place stress on all community
members (Wilkenson and Pickett, 2007) which leads to greater tobacco use (Rahkonen et al,
2005). Therefore, changes in income inequality will eectively coordinate changes in tobacco
use for individuals in the community. g corresponds to Manski's correlated eects. In the
current context, a correlated eect is present if permanent dierences in traditional and
spiritual use of tobacco across communities lead to dierences in mean smoking behavior.
As mentioned above, I assume that correlated eects are constant over time and can be
captured by including a community xed eect.
Two models of tobacco use, resulting in three estimating equations, are used to estimate
price elasticity. The rst, which I refer to as the non-social model, imposes the non-existence
8of endogenous social eects. In other words  = 0. Under this specication the existence of













The use of superscripts, NS, highlights that these parameters may dier from those in the
social model.
The second model follows the utility specication in Eq. (1) and allows for the possibility



















Notice that the coecients for variables that aect the entire group all contain the social
multiplier, 1=(1   ).
The third estimating equation uses the two-stage strategy outlined by Graham and Hahn
(2005) to estimate the structural equation directly. In the rst stage the elements of Egt [X]
are used as excluded instruments to estimate Egt [s]. In the second stage the correspondent
predicted values of \ Egt [s] to estimate (4) directly. This estimation strategy is summarized
by the following equations:
















igt + \ Egt [s] + I
0
gt + Pgt + g + igt;
(8)
Notice that the extent to which Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) yield dierent estimates of price
elasticity depends on the magnitude of . If  = 0 then the coecients associated with price
for the two equations will be approximately equivalent (for Eq. (6) this will depend on the
9correlation between prices and the excluded community means). If 0 <  < 1, then the price
coecient for Eq. (7) will be strictly larger than the price coecient for Eq. (8). Further,
the two price coecients will dier by 1=(1   ) where  is estimated directly in Eq. (8).
The data|discussed in greater detail in Section 3|used to estimate equations (6), (7)
and (8) is a randomly drawn sample from two time periods (1991 and 2001) and 95 distinct
communities. Xigt includes a quadratic age term, a sex indicator, household size, marital
status, family and respondent income (in $100,000 increments), employment status, high-
school graduation status, and a community problem index. The community problem index
is constructed based on the answers to seven binary response questions regarding whether
the respondent thought various social issues where a problem in the community.3 The index
is the proportion of these questions for which an armative response is given. Igt is the
within-community standard deviation of personal income. Sample analogs for Egt [X] are
constructed using the population weights provided in the survey and all observations available
for each community.4 Summary statistics for these variables are provided in Table 1.
The identication strategy uses between-community variation in the change in community
averages for Xigt between the two time periods|variation in Eg2001 [X]   Eg1991 [X]|to
identify the eect of community tobacco use on individual tobacco use ( in Eq. (8)). The
3The seven questions ask if the respondent believes suicide, unemployment, family violence, rape, sexual
abuse, drug abuse or alcohol abuse are problems in the community.
4The use of sample analogs gives rise to concern about attenuation bias. To see this write Eq. (7) in
sample analogs:
sigt = X0


















Egt[X]    Xgt
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= 0. This error-in-variables may lead to an attenuation bias, and under-estimate the
coecients in =(1 ). Further, correlation between individual variables (assumed to be measured without
error) and community aggregates may result in estimates of  that are biased in an unspecied direction. In
an attempt to address the attenuation bias I implemented a split-sample IV estimation approach (as used in
Auld (2009)). Unfortunately this strategy resulted in dramatically larger standard errors, likely due to the
relatively small community samples, and was not included. Therefore, coecient estimates for community
aggregates will likely under-estimate the true eect.
10between-community mean and standard deviation for each variable in Eg2001 [X] Eg1991 [X]
is summarized in the far right column of Table 1. This identication strategy requires the
exclusionary restriction that no contextual eects are associated with the elements of Xigt.
The intuition underlying this exclusionary restriction is captured by the following thought
experiment: Consider a moving a randomly chosen individual from his current community to
a hypothetical community which is observably identical, including tobacco use, except that
the high-school graduation rate is 10 percent higher. The exclusionary restriction means that
the individual will not have a dierent pattern of tobacco use in the second community than
in the rst. Exclusionary restrictions are violated if, regardless of their own tobacco use,
more educated community members are more likely to support anti-smoking programs and
such programs have a measurable eect. In this case, estimates will falsely attribute the cor-
relation between individual tobacco use and the community age distribution to endogenous
social interactions rather than to the unobserved policy interventions.
If contextual eects are present for some or all elements of Egt [X], estimates for Eq.
(7) are unbiased but the structural form of the coecients associated with each element
in Egt [X] will be ( + )=(1   ), so the endogenous and contextual social eect cannot
be separately identied (Manski, 1993). However, a non-zero value for any elements in the
vector ( + )=(1   ) indicate that at least one of the two social eects are present.
Table 1
3 Data
The primary data for this study is drawn from the 1991 and 2001 waves of the Aborigi-
nal Peoples Survey (APS), a post-census survey administered by Statistics Canada. The
condential micro-data is accessed through the Statistics Canada's Research Data Center.
Communities are identied by unique census sub-division codes. I restrict the sample to
11communities that are sampled in both the 1991 and 2001 APS and exclude communities
with less than 45 observations in each period. The result is a total of 95 aboriginal commu-
nities5 consisting of 24,400 individuals (an average 23 percent sample for each community
based on 2001 census populations) from which sample analogs for community means are
calculated. For regression estimation, data is restricted to respondents between the ages of
18 and 60. Further, observations missing any outcome or control variables are omitted. The
nal regression sample consists of 17,720 individual observations.
Survey participation is voluntary and conditional on Census participation. As many
Aboriginal communities do not participate in the Census the APS under-represents com-
munities in Ontario, Quebec and Eastern Canada. All long form (form 2B) 1991 Census
respondents who reported at least one Aboriginal origin6 received the 1991 APS (Statistics
Canada, 1995). The response rate for the 1991 APS is 87 percent. Likewise, long form
(form 2D for on-reserve respondents) 2001 Census respondents who either reported Aborig-
inal ancestry (question 17) or identied themselves as Aboriginal (questions 18, 20 or 21)
are targeted for the 2001 wave of the APS with an on-reserve response rate of 88 percent
(Statistics Canada, 2003). Due to cost considerations, the 2001 survey sampled 50 to 55
percent of the participating communities in each province, beginning with the largest. In
the case of British Columbia, where there are many small communities, less than 50 percent
of the communities are surveyed. For this reason the APS is not a representative sample of
Aboriginal communities in Canada.
3.1 Tobacco use in Aboriginal communities
Tobacco use summary statistics are presented in Table 2. Smoking rates are high in these
communities relative to non-Aboriginal populations. 60 and 58 percent of respondents in-
5A complete list of all these communities can be found in the Appendix.
6Aboriginal origin is dened as having identied ethnic origin as North American Indian, Metis or Inuit
(Census form question 15), or as registered under the Indian Act (Census form question 16.)
12dicated that they smoked cigarettes in the 1991 and 2001 surveys. Daily cigarette smoking
increased slightly between surveys, from 41 to 43 percent of respondents. Smoking intensity
(measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day) decreased by about two cigarettes
per day between 1991 and 2001.
Table 2
Similar to non-aboriginal communities, the average age of initiation for tobacco use in
these communities is 16 years. Smokers who successfully quit do so at an average age of 31,
and the average daily smoker has been smoking for 17.5 years. Finally, in the 1991 survey, 69
percent of respondents (both smokers and non-smokers) indicate that at least one smoker,
other than themselves, lives in their household.
3.2 Community level referencing
Critical to the incorporation of social eects in empirical estimation is the a priori iden-
tication of the reference group for each individual observation (Manski, 1993, 2000). In
this study it is assumed that an individual's reference group is other individuals in the same
community. To show that this is a reasonable assumption, in this section the geographic,
social and economic structure of the communities in this sample is discussed. The reference
group assumption is based on the fact that these communities are relatively small, secluded,
and self-sucient. Migration in and out of the communities is also relatively low.
Many of the communities, particularly those in the North, are located in relatively un-
populated regions of Canada a signicant distance from major city centers. Likely because of
this, these communities are relatively self-sucient. Based on a 2003 report, 74 percent have
schools and recreation centers, 80 percent have health care centers, and 60 and 48 percent
have re and police services.7 In 1991 50 percent of actively employed respondents worked
7The respective infrastructure for each community is reported in the Appendix. All
13in the community, a number that increased to 78 percent in 2001 (see Table 3).8
The APS data suggests that movement into and out of these communities is low. In
Table 3, I display summary statistics reecting the mobility of respondents. The number
of respondents who report having lived in the community their entire life was 46 percent in
1991 and 69 percent in 2001. Only 10 and 18 percent of respondents, for 1991 and 2001,
report having lived outside of the community within ve years of the survey.
Table 3
A selection bias will result if aggregate tobacco consumption inuences an individual's
decision to remain on or move o their reserve. Individual's with strong anti-smoking sen-
timents may choose to move o a reserve with high smoking rates, but stay on a reserve
with low smoking rates. This will lead to a spurious correlation between aggregate tobacco
consumption and individual tobacco consumption attributable to endogenous community
selection rather than endogenous social eects. My estimation of endogenous social eects
assumes that this problem is suciently insignicant. This assumption is supported by a
relatively constant (or increasing) population size in all reserves over the time period of in-
terest and the low mobility rates reported in Table 3. Further, a study conducted by the
Institute of Urban Studies (2003) found that, for families that moved from reserves to the
city of Winnipeg, 90 percent of respondents cited family, employment, and education as
being their primary reasons for moving. Only 1.3 percent of respondents cited alcohol and
substance abuse as the primary motivate for leaving the reserve. Given this, the number of
relocations due to tobacco use is likely very small.
information is found at the Government of Canada's Aboriginal Canada Portal web site:
http://www.aboriginalcanada.gc.ca/acp/site.nsf/eng/index.html
8The increase in on-reserve employment is likely, in part, a response to 1995 changes to income tax
exemptions. The changes required that tax-exempt exempt employment take place on reserve.
143.3 Tobacco taxation in Aboriginal communities
Section 87 of the Indian Act exempts all Status Indians from provincial sales taxes levied
on tobacco (Gardner-O'Toole, 1992). To qualify for exemption, tobacco products must be
purchased on a reserve, and the purchaser must present proof of Status. Some provinces
impose a quota on the amount of tobacco an individual can purchase over a dened period
(Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, 2007), but these quotas are large relative to the needs
of individual smokers and will not be considered in the analysis.9 Status Indians are not
exempt from federal excise taxes on tobacco (Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, 2007).
Tobacco price information for individual communities between 1991 and 2001 is not
available. Therefore, tobacco prices in this study reect the average price by year and
province for Status Indians purchasing on a reserve (the exception is the Kamloops reserve
which implemented a First Nations Tax.) Prices, summarized in Table 4, are constructed
using average provincial prices and information on the implementation of tax exemptions.
Exogenous price variation comes from three sources. The rst is federal excise tax re-
ductions in the early 1990s, which were larger in the Eastern provinces than the Western
provinces. Second, band councils have the authority to implement a First Nations Tax (FNT)
in the communities they oversee. In 1998 the Kamloops Band became one of only 11 bands
in Canada (and the only in this sample) to implement a 7 percent FNT on tobacco products
sold on the Kamloops reserve10 (Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, 2007). Finally, varia-
tion comes from dierences in how provincial tax exemptions are implemented. The province
of Saskatchewan did not recognize tax exemptions until March 30, 2000 (Saskatchewan De-
partment of Finance, 2010), which resulted in a 39 percent decrease in the point-of-sale
price of tobacco in Saskatchewan between 1999 and 2000. For communities in the province
of Manitoba and the Lennox Island reserve in Prince Edward Island (included in the sam-
9For example, Alberta imposes a 4-carton, or 800 cigarettes, per week per individual quota.
10The sample analyzed in this study contains the Kamloops 1 community. More information on the
Kamloops FNT can be found at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/gi/notice92a/notice92a-e.html.
15ple), taxes are applied at the retail level and reimbursed to local First Nations band councils
(Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, 2007). As the interest of this study is the point-of-sale
price, these communities are treated as fully reecting the provincial tobacco tax.
Table 4
Because cigarette prices in a given year are constant across all reserves within a province
(Kamloops being the exception), I must assume that price changes are uncorrelated with any
other unobservable factors that changed at the provincial level and inuenced tobacco use.
For example, if a decrease in tobacco prices is met with an aggressive Aboriginal tobacco
education campaign implemented in a province, the inuence of price on smoking behavior
may be under-estimated.
4 Results
Three equations are estimated: the non-social Eq. (6), the reduced form Eq. (7), and the
structural Eq. (8). These three equations allow me to comment on the inuence that social
interactions have on estimates of elasticity and any bias that may result when social eects
are excluded.
Three binary outcomes are considered: smoking participation, daily smoking, and oc-
casional smoking (conditional on not being a daily smoker). As all models are estimated
linearly, binary outcomes are interpreted as linear probability models.11 The three equations
are also estimated for smoking intensity, as reected by number of cigarettes consumed per
day. In addition to providing a robustness check, these four outcomes provide unique in-
formation with respect to price changes. Regressions include community xed eects and
11By specifying a linear-in-means framework I am able to precisely interpret estimated coecient from
the dierent equations. Binary outcome models have also been estimated using a probit specication. As
expected, estimated marginal eects between the probit and linear estimates are very similar (see Angrist
and Pischke (2008, 103{107) for a discussion on this property).
16community level clustering of standard errors. Estimates for smoking intensity as the out-
come also include a year dummy variable.12
4.1 Non-social equation estimates
Table 5
Estimates corresponding to Eq. (6) for each of the four outcomes are reported in Table
5. The estimated eects of tobacco price on tobacco use are economically non-trivial. A 10
percent increase in the price of tobacco is predicted to decrease overall rates of adult tobacco
use by 0.55 percentage points. The estimated elasticity for daily smoking and occasional
smoking are similar in magnitude. A 10 percent increase in the price of tobacco is predicted
to decrease rates of daily adult smoking by 0.52 percentage points and occasional smoking by
0.49 percentage points. A ten percent increase in tobacco use predicted to decrease average
cigarette consumption by approximately 0.113 cigarettes per day.
A number of the signicant determinants of adult tobacco use are consistent with the
ndings reported in studies for non-Aboriginal populations. For example, the inuence of
demographic characteristics, marital status and income on adult tobacco use is very similar
to what is found using the Current Population Survey (Cutler and Glaeser, 2007). The
age-quadratic indicates that the propensity to smoke for overall and daily smoking increases
until age 50 and decreases afterwards. The propensity for occasional smoking ends much
earlier, increasing until age 38 and decreasing thereafter. Controlling for other factors, males
are 1.7 percentage points less likely to be daily smokers, but consume one cigarette more per
day, then their female counterparts. Married individuals are 8.0 percentage points less likely
to smoke than individuals never married and smoke three-quarters of a cigarette less per day.
The coecients for household and individual income are negative and statistically signicant
12Year dummies do not have a signicant impact on estimates for binary outcomes and were therefore
excluded to conserve degrees of freedom.
17but economically small. At best, a ten-thousand dollar increase in personal income reduces
tobacco use by 1 percentage point.
Aboriginal adults who graduate high school are 11.3 percent less likely to smoke and 10.8
percent less likely to smoke daily than those who leave high school without completion. This
is consistent with the ndings of several studies that show a strong negative relationship
between education outcomes and tobacco use (de Walque, 2007; Cutler and Glaeser, 2007.)
The estimates in Table 5 are also consistent with the theory that tobacco is used as a
coping mechanism in stressful circumstances (Rahkonen et al., 2005). The community prob-
lem index reects individual perceptions of community health (these perceptions may or
may not reect reality.) It seems reasonable that individuals who perceive the community in
which they live as having more social problems, and therefore a higher community problem
index, feel more stress and anxiety. Consistent with coping theory, individuals who identify
one more social problem (a 0.14 unit increase in the index) are 0.6 percentage points more
likely to be a daily smoker and smoke 0.17 more cigarettes per day. Similarly, unemployed
individuals are 4.4 percentage points more likely to be smokers than those not in the labour
force. Contextual eects are also consistent with coping theory; individuals living in com-
munities with a higher standard deviation of personal income are more likely to smoke daily
(although this estimate is imprecise.)
Within many communities tobacco is considered a sacred plant. Therefore, individuals
who are engaged in traditional Aboriginal culture may be more likely to disregard warnings
about the dangers of smoking (see McKennitt (2005) for a discussion). However, ceremonial
use involves consuming relatively small amounts of tobacco and is unlikely to lead to abuse.
Estimates are consistent with this reasoning; individuals who speak a traditional Aboriginal
language are 2.3 percentage points more likely to identify themselves as smokers, however,
this is due only to an increase in occasional smoking. Individuals who speak a traditional
language are no more likely than non-speakers to be daily smokers.
184.2 Reduced form estimates
Estimates for Eq. (7) are reported in Table 6. The addition of community aggregates does
not signicantly change the estimated private eects relative to those in Table 5, and will not
be discussed further. Many of the coecient estimates associated with community means
are statistically insignicant. This may be the result of low variation across communities
and time leading to imprecise estimates or attenuation bias arising from the use of sample
analogs in place of community means. However, many coecients have an economically
meaningful magnitude.
Table 6
Conditional on own age, an individual in a relatively young community is more likely
to smoke occasionally (as opposed to never) than an individual in a relatively old commu-
nity. Further, daily smokers in younger communities consume more cigarettes per day. A
10 percent increase in traditional language use in the community increases the probability a
given individuals will be an occasional smoker by 2.27 percentage points. Indicators of com-
munity health, specically the mean community problem index and the standard deviation
of community income, have an interesting interpretation. Conditioning on an individual's
community problem index, an increases in the mean community problem index increases the
probability a given individual will be a daily smoker. A mean increase of one more problem
identied (increasing the index by 0.14) increases the probability of daily tobacco use by
1.89 percentage points.
For all outcomes the estimated coecient for the standard deviation of household income
within the community has increased in magnitude relative to Table 5. A ten-thousand
dollar increase in the standard deviation of community income increases the probability an
individual smokes by 7.85 percentage points.
19Relative to the non-social model, price elasticities are double in magnitude for overall
smoking and triple for occasional smoking. A 10 percent increase in the price of tobacco is
predicted to decrease overall smoking by 1.19 percentage points. This estimate is consistent
with tobacco price elasticities estimated for non-aboriginal population (for example see Ding
(2004), Sen and Wirjanto (2009) and Franz (2008)). Occasional smokers are now estimated
to be more price sensitive than daily smokers; a 10 percent price increase reduces daily
smoking by 0.75 percentage points and occasional smoking by 1.39 percentage points. This
result is consistent with intuition, as occasional smoking is less likely than daily smoking
to be associated with addiction. Finally, price estimates for smoking intensity suggest that
a 10 percent increase in the price of tobacco will reduce average tobacco consumption by
approximately 0.15 cigarettes per day.
4.3 Structural estimates
Eq. (8) is estimated using a two-stage generalized method of moments procedure (Stata's
XTIVREG2 command). Community aggregates, Egt[X], are used as excluded instruments
for community level tobacco consumption, Egt[s]. The results are reported in Table 7.
Coecients corresponding to community aggregates for each of the outcomes are interpreted
as endogenous social eects, parameter  from Eq. (2).
Table 7
Estimated values corresponding to individual characteristics show very little deviation
from those reported in Table 6. This is consistent with the prediction that endogenous social
interactions will not impact the estimated eect of variables that inuence the smoking
behavior of only one individual. Notice that we do see a dierence in the estimated eect
of the standard deviation of income within the community; the coecient is larger in the
20reduced form estimates than that structural estimates implying that the contextual eect is
multiplied by the endogenous social eect. This is a prediction of the model.
Likewise, we see the predicted change in price elasticity. The direct eect of a price
change, reported in Table 7, is less than the total eect of a price change, reported in Table
6. Through the direct eect, a 10 percent increase in the price of tobacco is predicted to
decrease overall smoking by 0.45 percentage points, daily smoking by 0.26 percentage points
and occasional smoking by 0.53 percentage points. The direct eect of a 10 percent price
increase is to decrease smoking intensity by about 0.06 cigarettes per day. This highlights
the importance of endogenous social eects in observed outcomes: endogenous social eects
more than double the eect of a change in price on tobacco use relative to the direct eect
alone.
The estimated endogenous eects are large and signicant. Consider moving a randomly
chosen individual from their current community to a hypothetical community, identical in
every respect except tobacco use. If the hypothetical community has a 10 percentage point
higher smoking rate then the move will increase that individual's propensity to smoke by 5.6
percentage points. This is consistent with endogenous social eects estimated for tobacco
use by Cutler and Glaeser (2007) and Powell et al. (2005), but larger than those reported in
Krauth (2007). Similar endogenous social eects are estimated for the remaining outcomes.
A 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of daily smokers increase the probability an
individual smokes daily by 7.25 percentage points. A 10 percent increase in the proportion of
occasional smokers increase the probability an individual smokes occasionally (as opposed to
not smoking) by 8.66 percentage points. Finally, following an exogenous increase in average
smoking intensity of 1 cigarette per day individual smoking intensity is expected to increase
by 0.86 cigarettes per day.
As the model is over-identied, Hansen's J is used to test the null hypothesis that exclu-
sionary restrictions are valid. The corresponding p-values, reported at the bottom of Table
217, fail to reject the validity of the exclusionary restrictions. However, it is concerning that
the rst stage regression F-statistics, corresponding to the excluded instruments, are quite
low. This suggests that some or all of the excluded instruments are weak. If this is the case,
then the estimated values of  will be biased towards the OLS estimates13. With this in
mind I provide two alternative estimates of the endogenous social eect. The rst exploits
the fact that  can be recovered from the estimated direct and total elasticities. The second
re-estimates Eq. (8) with a restricted set of instruments.
The elasticity estimates between Table 6 and Table 7 change predictably given the esti-
mated values of ; the social model of tobacco use states that the price elasticities of Eq.
(7) and Eq. (8) dier by a multiple of 1=(1   ). If the theory accurately reects reality, 
can be recovered from the two estimates of price elasticity in Table 6 and Table 7 for each
outcome. In panel A of Table 8 estimates of  from regression Eq. (8) and derived from the
dierence in elasticity estimates between Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) are displayed. Row 2
1 reports
the p-value corresponding to a test on the null hypothesis that the direct and the indirect
estimates are equal. For each estimate I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the regression
and derived estimates are equivalent.
Table 8
The low reported values for the rst stage F-statistic in Panel A of Table 8 remain
troubling. The bias arising from weak instruments is inversely related to the number of
weak instruments, with the just identied case being approximately unbiased (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009, pp.205{15). To check if the reported estimates are being inated by weak
instruments I follow the advice of Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp.212{13) and restrict the
excluded instruments to those that are most highly correlated with the endogenous regressors
in the rst stage regression. The resulting excluded instruments are: high school graduation
13Not reported here, the OLS estimated coecients are close to 1.0 for each of the outcomes.
22rate and proportion of males for overall smoking rates; high school graduation rate and
average community problem index for occasional smoking and for daily smoking; average
community problem index for smoking intensity. The resulting estimates are reported in
Panel B of Table 8.
Restricting the number of instruments decreases the regression estimates of . However,
all estimates remain economically signicant. For overall smoking ^  is now 0.46, while
values for the remaining outcomes fall between 0.60 and 0.70. For the overall smoking rate
the derived estimate of ^  is remarkably close to the regression estimate. However, for the
remaining outcomes the derived estimates are imprecise and notably lower in value. As
expected the rst stage F statistics have all increased considerably over those reported in
Panel A, with the exception of daily smoking. Overall these results suggest that the regression
estimates reported in Table 7 may over-estimate , with the true value being closer to 0.45{
0.60 for each outcome. Therefore, estimates remain economically signicant in magnitude
and consistent with endogenous social eects estimated in the previous literature.
5 Conclusions
Using the 1991 and 2001 waves of the Aboriginal Peoples Survey I create a repeated cross-
section of Canadian Aboriginal communities and use it to analyze smoking behavior. Three
important contributions are made. i) I provide separate estimates of the direct and the
total eect of a tobacco tax. ii) I estimate the community level impact of endogenous social
interactions on adult tobacco use. iii) I provide the the rst estimates of tobacco price
elasticity in Canada's Aboriginal communities.
Previous policy studies suggest that the tobacco tax is an important instrument to address
high rates of tobacco consumption in Aboriginal communities. For example, Samji and
Wardman (2009) hypothesize that a 7 percent First Nations Tax (FNT) will reduce smoking
23rates by 2.4 percent and provincial tax rate (50 percent) will reduce smoking rates by 22.5
percent.14 My estimates suggest that the eect of tax policy on adult tobacco consumption
will be about half this size: relative to 2001 levels, overall smoking rates for Aboriginal
adults will decrease by 1.4 percent (0.8 percentage points) following a 7 percent FNT and
(10.2 percent) 5.9 percentage points following a provincial tax. Further, a tax will have a
greater proportional eect on occasional smoking than daily smoking. A 50 percent tax will
decrease daily smoking by 8.5 percent and occasional smoking by 46.3 percent from 2001
levels.
The ability to identify an individual's community allows me to identify a feasible reference
group. Although the analysis is weakened by the inability to cleanly identify an instrument
for mean community tobacco use, I believe I am able to provide meaningful information
about the relationship between policy intervention and social interactions. I nd that social
interactions double the negative inuence of price on adult tobacco use over the direct
eect alone (given the results reported in Table 6 and Table 7.) Further, not accounting
for social interactions may yield biased estimates; the total eect of price on behavior is
under-estimated for all outcomes.
The importance of endogenous social interactions needs to be considered in policy design.
First, policy interventions that are applied to a sub-group within the population will have
meaningful spillovers to the larger population. For example, the availability of quit-smoking
assistance in the work place will impact smoking in the larger community. Second, broadly
applied interventions will be more eective (i.e. have a larger multiplier) than narrowly
focused interventions. Third, when only the direct eect of an intervention is know, as
may be the case in trial studies randomized across individuals, we cannot determine the
eectiveness of a policy by aggregating individual behavior. Estimates of the endogenous
14The predicted eect of tobacco taxation in Samji and Wardman (2009) is based on elasticity estimated
for non-aboriginal populations by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
24social eect provide a mechanism for adjusting from randomized trial to large-scale policy.
The results of this study have relevance beyond smoking in Aboriginal communities.
One may worry endogenous social eects are larger in Aboriginal communities than in non-
Aboriginal populations. This concern can be mitigated by noting that the estimated total
price eect is similar in magnitude to estimates from non-Aboriginal adult populations. If
endogenous social eects are larger, then the direct eect must be weaker in Aboriginal
communities than in non-aboriginal communities. This seems unlikely, given that household
income in Aboriginal communities is well below the Canadian average. Further, the analysis
in this study will apply to any socially inuenced good or behavior, such as obesity and low
physical activity, drug and alcohol use, or education and labour force participation.
These ndings should interest economists and policy makers alike. Unfortunately, em-
pirical identication of social eects more generally is severely limited by data availability.
Surveys that include questions directed at identifying reference group behaviors are vital
to move this research forward. Given the importance of this information for health and
social policy research, ensuring such information is collected in national data should be high
priority.
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28Table 1: Demographic, income and labour summary statistics
1991 2001 1991{2001
Mean SDW SDB N Mean SDW SDB N  SD
Age 34.75 15.97 2.25 11,090 36.09 15.78 2.36 12,920 1.58 1.81
Males 0.52 0.50 0.05 11,090 0.50 0.50 0.04 12,930 0.00 0.06
Household size 5.55 2.57 0.98 11,090 4.89 2.29 0.84 12,770 -0.64 0.64
Married 0.88 0.92 0.20 11,090 0.75 0.89 0.18 12,770 0.01 0.04
Family income 20,875 18,296 8,176 11,090 24,864 23,187 9,373 12,770 4,400 6,126
Personal income 9,048 10,161 1,957 11,090 12,784 13,429 3,179 12,770 3,736 2,781
Employed 0.31 0.45 0.09 11,030 0.39 0.48 0.10 12,570 0.08 0.10
Unemployed 0.15 0.35 0.07 11,030 0.12 0.31 0.05 12,570 -0.03 0.08
High school graduate 0.15 0.34 0.08 9,570 0.23 0.41 0.09 11,390 0.09 0.07
Attending School 0.17 0.37 0.05 11,090 0.12 0.33 0.04 12,470 -0.01 0.07
Speaks a trad. language 0.84 0.23 0.21 10,930 0.80 0.31 0.20 12,890 -0.04 0.12
Community problem index 0.51 0.26 0.11 10,680 0.61 0.27 0.10 12,520 0.10 0.11
SDW and SDB are standard deviations for within and between communities,  denotes the average change
in mean community values across the two time periods and SD is the between community standard
deviation in the change over the time periods. 95 communities covered. Population weights used in all
calculations. N, the number of observations, is rounded for condentiality requirements.
Table 2: Tobacco use summary statistics
1991 2001
Mean SDW SDB N Mean SDW SDB N
Smokers 0.60 0.48 0.10 10,840 0.58 0.48 0.11 12,480
Daily smokers 0.41 0.48 0.11 10,840 0.43 0.48 0.12 12,480
Cig. per day (daily) 14.78 9.26 3.30 4,509 12.07 7.20 2.41 5,320
Cig. per day (occasional) 4.98 3.93 1.28 1,790
Age started 16.05 4.80 1.09 5,240
Age stopped 31.47 13.31 3.39 1,900
Years smoked 17.48 12.45 3.26 5,240
Other smokers in household 0.69 0.45 0.12 10,811
SDW and SDB are standard deviations for within and between communities. 95 communities covered.
Population weights used in all calculations. Individual observation count rounded as per condentiality
requirements.
Table 3: Mobility summary statistics
1991 2001
Mean SDW SDB N Mean SDW SDB N
Lived on reserve entire life 0.46 0.46 0.196 10,829 0.69 0.44 0.131 12,840
Lived o reserve past 5 years 0.10 0.28 0.061 11,081 0.18 0.365 0.098 10,560
Currently works on reserve 0.50 0.37 0.310 5,715 0.78 0.34 0.202 5,710
SDW and SDB are standard deviations for within and between communities. 95 communities covered.
Population weights used in all calculations. Individual observation count rounded as per condentiality
requirements.
29Table 4: Cigarette prices in survey years
Province 1991 2001 %  Communities
NF 35.32 32.42 -8.21 1
PEI 52.08 44.48 -14.59 2
NS 37.50 31.47 -16.08 3
NB 39.36 35.33 -10.24 1
PQ 33.53 26.87 -19.86 3
ON 36.11 28.86 -20.08 7
MN 53.27 51.28 -3.74 14
SK 50.88 30.73 -39.60 30
AB 31.85 28.36 -10.96 12
BC 30.40 28.15 -7.40 21
Kamloops 30.40 30.12 -0.92 1
Prices reect the real price of 200 cigarettes for Status Indians purchasing on reserve. Nominal prices are
adjusted using provincial consumer price index (2001 dollars.)
Table 5: Estimates with no endogenous social eects
Smoke Smoke Smoke Cigarettes
Occasionally Daily per Day
. . .
log(Cigarette prices) -0.055* (0.030) -0.049 (0.045) -0.052 (0.044) -1.130 (0.978)
Age 0.011*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.410*** (0.051)
Age-squared/100 -0.022*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.004) -0.017*** (0.003) -0.571*** (0.061)
Male -0.013 (0.009) -0.003 (0.010) -0.017* (0.010) 1.027*** (0.205)
Household size 0.005*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.460)
Divorced/sept./wid. 0.028* (0.016) -0.007 (0.019) 0.039** (0.016) 1.293*** (0.404)
Married -0.080*** (0.010) -0.074*** (0.013) -0.056*** (0.009) -0.771*** (0.244)
Family inc./100k -0.090*** (0.020) -0.107*** (0.024) -0.048*** (0.018) -0.899*** (0.373)
Respondent inc./100k -0.113*** (0.033) -0.095** (0.038) -0.067* (0.035) -2.177*** (0.811)
Employed -0.001 (0.010) -0.005 (0.012) 0.002 (0.011) 0.044 (0.203)
Unemployed 0.044*** (0.011) 0.044*** (0.015) 0.029*** (0.011) 0.567** (0.283)
High school grad. -0.113*** (0.011) -0.070*** (0.012) -0.108*** (0.011) -2.300*** (0.280)
Attending school -0.018 (0.016) -0.025 (0.022) -0.009 (0.016) -1.076*** (0.316)
Speaks a trad. language 0.023** (0.010) 0.042*** (0.013) 0.000 (0.010) -0.286 (0.222)
Community problem index 0.008 (0.014) -0.022 (0.018) 0.041** (0.017) 1.221*** (0.333)
Community Aggregates . . .
SD of personal income/1000 0.201 (0.216) -0.033 (0.274) 0.338 (0.258) 7.017 (5.526)
Observations 17,720 9,590 17,720 14,635
Adjusted R-squared 4.17% 3.91% 2.11% 3.14%
***,**,* Signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors adjusted for community level
clustering are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include community xed eects. Family income is
net of respondent's income. Cigarette prices reect the point-of-sale price of 200 cigarettes for Status
Indians purchasing on reserve. Nominal monetary variables are adjusted using the provincial consumer
price index (2001 dollars.)
30Table 6: Reduced form estimates with endogenous social eects
Smoke Smoke Smoke Cigarettes
Occasionally Daily per Day
. . .
log(Cigarette prices) -0.119*** (0.039) -0.139** (0.062) -0.075 (0.056) -1.526 (1.144)
Age 0.011*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.005* (0.003) 0.412*** (0.050)
Age-squared/100 -0.022*** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.017*** (0.003) -0.574*** (0.061)
Male -0.014 (0.009) -0.004 (0.010) -0.018* (0.010) 1.009*** (0.206)
Household size 0.005*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.046)
Divorced/sept./wid. 0.026 (0.016) 0.008 (0.019) -0.036** (0.016) 1.255*** (0.406)
Married -0.081*** (0.010) -0.075*** (0.013) -0.057*** (0.009) -0.790*** (0.241)
Family income/100,000 -0.090*** (0.021) -0.109*** (0.024) -0.048** (0.018) -0.981** (0.395)
Respondent income/100,000 -0.106*** (0.033) -0.092** (0.038) -0.060* (0.036) -2.084** (0.811)
Employed -0.001 (0.009) -0.004 (0.012) 0.001 (0.011) 0.047 (0.200)
Unemployed 0.046*** (0.010) 0.044*** (0.015) 0.030*** (0.011) -0.622** (0.277)
High school grad. -0.111*** (0.011) -0.070*** (0.012) -0.107*** (0.011) -2.283*** (0.281)
Attending school(not hs grad.) -0.017 (0.016) -0.023 (0.022) -0.010 (0.016) -1.101*** (0.321)
Speaks a trad. language 0.021** (0.010) 0.037*** (0.013) 0.000 (0.010) -0.273 (0.220)
Community problem index 0.005 (0.014) -0.022 (0.018) 0.035** (0.016) 1.100*** (0.333)
Community Aggregates . . .
Age < 20yrs 0.478 (0.386) 1.020** (0.484) -0.035 (0.492) 13.916 (12.278)
Age 20{29yrs 0.068 (0.321) 0.410 (0.418) -0.213 (0.377) 9.634 (10.811)
Age 30{39yrs 0.029 (0.287) 0.156 (0.378) -0.086 (0.313) 8.973 (10.107)
Age 40{49yrs 0.088 (0.370) 0.215 (0.419) 0.020 (0.437) 9.927 (9.502)
Age 50{59yrs -0.080 (0.294) -0.067 (0.352) -0.088 (0.309) 14.653 (9.337)
Males 0.237 (0.235) 0.365 (0.338) 0.111 (0.311) 5.631 (8.217)
Household Size -0.010 (0.016) -0.029 (0.020) 0.001 (0.020) -0.271 (0.532)
Divorced/sept./wid. 0.342 (0.243) 0.252 (0.300) 0.280 (0.316) 7.632 (5.494)
Married 0.256** (0.110) 0.170 (0.155) 0.261* (0.141) 5.532 (3.731)
Family income/100,000 0.097 (0.199) 0.184 (0.253) 0.001 (0.274) 6.128 (5.542)
Respondent income/100,000 -0.872* (0.521) -0.380 (0.775) -0.955 (0.641) -17.894 (12.806)
Employed 0.040 (0.112) -0.185 (0.154) 0.191 (0.125) 0.823 (3.001)
Unemployed -0.153 (0.193) -0.097 (0.210) -0.197 (0.208) -6.270* (3.230)
High school grad. -0.127 (0.123) -0.025 (0.188) -0.215 (0.147) -1.547 (2.676)
Attending school -0.229 (0.141) -0.512** (0.205) 0.034 (0.202) 0.168 (4.066)
Speaks a trad. language 0.105 (0.069) 0.239** (0.113) -0.020 (0.076) -1.273 (2.013)
Community problem index 0.123 (0.086) 0.038 (0.129) 0.179* (0.092) 3.483* (1.783)
SD of personal income/100,000 0.788** (0.379) 0.300 (0.538) 0.862* (0.435) 13.624 (8.515)
Observations 17,720 9,590 17,720 14,635
Adjusted R-squared 4.20% 3.95% 2.14% 3.21%
***,**,* Signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors adjusted for community level
clustering are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include community xed eects. Family income is
net of respondent's income. Cigarette prices reect the point-of-sale price of 200 cigarettes for Status
Indians purchasing on reserve. Nominal monetary variables are adjusted using the provincial consumer
price index (2001 dollars.)
31Table 7: Structural estimates with endogenous social eects
Smoke Smoke Smoke Cigarettes
Occasionally Daily per Day
log(Cigarette prices) -0.045** (0.018) -0.053* (0.030) -0.026 (0.017) -0.647 (0.552)
Age 0.011** (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.408*** (0.050)
Age-squared/100 -0.022*** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.017*** (0.003) -0.568*** (0.060)
Male -0.014 (0.009) -0.003 (0.010) -0.017* (0.009) 1.036*** (0.204)
Household size 0.005*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.046)
Divorced, separated, widowed 0.027* (0.016) -0.007 (0.018) 0.037** (0.016) 1.255*** (0.408)
Married -0.081*** (0.010) -0.074*** (0.013) -0.057*** (0.009) -0.787*** (0.242)
Family income/100,000 -0.090*** (0.020) -0.105*** (0.023) -0.048*** (0.018) -0.939** (0.386)
Respondent income/100,000 -0.108*** (0.033) -0.098*** (0.038) -0.060* (0.035) -2.037** (0.802)
Employed -0.001 (0.009) -0.003 (0.012) 0.001 (0.010) 0.055 (0.199)
Unemployed 0.046*** (0.010) 0.044*** (0.015) 0.030*** (0.011) -0.603** (0.278)
High school grad. -0.111*** (0.011) -0.070*** (0.012) -0.106*** (0.011) -2.275*** (0.297)
Attending school -0.017 (0.016) -0.023 (0.022) -0.010 (0.016) -1.082*** (0.320)
Speaks a trad. language 0.022** (0.010) 0.039*** (0.013) 0.000 (0.010) -0.235 (0.216)
Community problem index 0.007 (0.013) -0.017 (0.017) 0.036** (0.016) 1.076*** (0.321)
Community Aggregates . . .
Comm. smoking rate 0.555*** (0.089)
Comm. smoking rate (daily) 0.866*** (0.263)
Comm. smoking rate (occ.) 0.752*** (0.112)
Comm. smoking intensity 0.863*** (0.130)
SD of personal income/100,000 0.256* (0.141) 0.231 (0.232) 0.211* (0.127) 2.489 (3.124)
Observations 17,720 9,590 17,720 14,640
First stage F-stat 2.75 1.89 1.17 2.01
First stage partial R-square 26.58% 21.57% 15.59% 21.35%
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.051 0.175 0.188 0.501
***,**,* Signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors adjusted for community level
clustering are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include community xed eects. Family income is
net of respondent's income. Cigarette prices reect the point-of-sale price of 200 cigarettes for Status
Indians purchasing on reserve. Nominal monetary variables are adjusted using the provincial consumer
price index (2001 dollars.) First stage F-stat and R-square are for excluded instruments.
32Table 8: Regression and derived endogenous social eects
Smoke Smoke Smoke Cigarettes
Daily Occasionally per Day
A
Regression estimate 0.555*** (0.089) 0.866*** (0.263) 0.752*** (0.112) 0.863*** (0.130)
Derived estimate 0.619*** (0.206) 0.616*** (0.225) 0.642* (0.376) 0.564 (0.416)
2
(1) (p-value) 0.775 0.481 0.793 0.489
First stage F-stat 2.75 1.89 1.17 2.01
First stage partial R-square 26.58% 21.57% 15.59% 21.35%
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.051 0.175 0.188 0.501
B
Regression estimate 0.463*** (0.141) 0.621 (0.595) 0.661*** (0.112) 0.690*** (0.130)
Derived estimate 0.436** (0.215) 0.280 (0.276) 0.425 (0.376) 0.290 (0.363)
2
(1) (p-value) 0.875 0.541 0.044 0.245
First stage F-stat 8.60 1.78 5.01 5.80
First stage partial R-square 14.80% 4.45% 7.86% 5.02%
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.831 0.553 0.320 NA
***,**,* Signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors adjusted for community level
clustering are reported in parenthesis. Estimating equations include controls for individual quadratic age,
sex, household size, marital status, income, employment status, education, speaking of an aboriginal
language, community problem index, community standard deviation of personal income and community
xed eects. Panel A includes community aggregates as excluded instruments; Panel B restricts excluded
instruments. See text for details. 2
(1) refer to the chi-squared statistic corresponding to a test of the null
hypothesis that the regression and derived estimates are equivalent. First stage F-stat and R-square are for
excluded instruments. Standard errors for derived estimates are calculated in Stata using the Delta method.
33Appendix: Communities included in analysis
Census Community Province Population School Health Police Recreation Fire
Subdivision Name (2001) Center Center
1003801 Samiajij Miawpukek NF 837 yes yes yes yes yes
1103035 Lennox Island 1 PEI 261 yes yes yes yes yes
1208014 Indian Brook 14 NS 932 yes yes yes yes yes
1210003 Millbrook 27 NS 821 yes yes yes yes yes
1217020 Eskasoni 3 NS 2741 yes yes yes yes yes
1310034 Devon 30 NB 692 yes yes no yes no
2499804 Mistissini PQ 3125 no no no no no
2499806 Waskaganish PQ 1699 no yes yes no no
2499814 Chisasibi PQ 3467 no no yes no no
3543050 Mnjikaning F.N. 32 ON 597 yes yes yes yes no
3543069 Christian Island 30 ON 515 yes yes yes yes yes
3558003 Fort William 52 ON 599 no yes yes yes no
3559063 Couchiching 16A ON 595 no yes yes yes yes
3560053 Fort Hope 64 ON 1001 yes yes yes yes yes
3560070 Deer Lake ON 756 yes yes yes no no
3560071 Sandy Lake 88 ON 1704 yes yes yes yes yes
4606040 Sioux Valley 58 MB 1050 yes yes yes yes yes
4608069 Sandy Bay 5 MB 2446 yes yes yes yes yes
4616017 Waywayseecappo F.N. MB 1135 yes yes yes yes yes
4617029 Ebb and Flow 52 MB 991 yes yes no yes yes
4618067 Fairford 50 MB 820 yes yes no yes yes
4619056 Fisher River 44 MB 867 yes yes no yes yes
4621029 Chemawawin 2 MB 964 yes yes yes yes yes
4621043 Opaskwayak Cree Nation 21E MB 2025 yes - - - -
4622050 Oxford House 24 MB 1700 yes yes no yes yes
4622051 Cross Lake 19 MB 1491 yes yes no yes no
4622052 Cross Lake 19A MB 502 - - - - -
4622058 Norway House 17 MB 3950 no yes yes yes yes
4622059 Nelson House 170 MB 1710 yes yes yes yes yes
4622063 Split Lake 171 MB 1581 yes yes no yes yes
4701808 White Bear 70 SK 536 yes yes yes yes yes
4705803 Cowessess 73 SK 486 yes yes yes yes yes
4706809 Piapot 75 SK 503 yes yes no yes no
4706810 Assiniboine 76 SK 646 yes yes yes yes yes
4706811 Standing Bualo 78 SK 454 yes yes yes no yes
4706816 Peepeekisis 81 SK 396 yes yes no yes no
4710823 Gordon 86 SK 723 yes yes yes yes yes
4712830 Mosquito 109 SK 433 yes yes no yes no
4713835 Poundmaker 114 SK 505 yes yes yes yes yes
Community facility information and population sizes found at Aboriginal Canada Portal:
http://www.aboriginalcanada.gc.ca/acp/site.nsf/eng/index.html. F.N. stands for First Nation.
34Census Community Province Population School Health Police Recreation Fire
Subdivision Name (2001) Center Center
4713836 Little Pine 116 SK 567 yes yes no yes yes
4715849 James Smith 100 SK 624 yes yes no yes yes
4715853 Montreal Lake 106B SK 347 - - - - -
4716856 Sturgeon Lake 101 SK 873 yes yes yes yes yes
4716858 Big River 118 SK 1225 yes yes no yes yes
4716860 Ahtahkakoop 104 SK 1099 yes yes yes yes yes
4717801 Seekaskootch 119 SK 1834 yes yes yes yes yes
4717802 Makaoo (Part) 120 SK 175 - - - - -
4717805 Flying Dust F.N. 105 SK 575 yes yes yes yes no
4717806 Waterhen 130 SK 577 yes yes yes yes yes
4717807 Makwa Lake 129B SK 736 - - - - -
4717809 Ministikwan 161 SK 573 yes yes no yes yes
4717812 Moosomin 112B SK 514 yes yes yes yes yes
4718802 Montreal Lake 106 SK 861 yes yes yes yes yes
4718809 Lac La Ronge 156 SK 1181 - - - - -
4718812 Kitsakie 156B SK 560 - - - - -
4718814 Wapachewunak 192D SK 434 yes yes yes yes yes
4718817 Canoe Lake 165 SK 747 yes yes yes yes yes
4718818 Bualo River Dene Nation 193 SK 607 yes yes yes yes yes
4718828 Chicken 224 SK 1075 yes yes yes yes yes
4718839 Clearwater River SK 548 yes yes no yes yes
4803801 Peigan 147 AB - yes yes no yes yes
4803802 Blood 148 AB 3852 yes yes yes yes yes
4805802 Siksika 146 AB 2750 yes yes yes yes yes
4806804 Tsuu T'ina Nation 145 AB - - - - - -
4810805 Makaoo (Part) 120 AB 175 - - - - -
4811803 Louis Bull 138B AB 892 yes yes yes yes yes
4811804 Stony Plain 135 AB 1100 yes yes no yes yes
4815802 Stoney 142, 143, 144 AB 2173 yes yes no yes yes
4817819 Wabasca 166A AB 510 - - - - -
4817823 Wabasca 166D AB 860 yes no no no no
4817824 Utikoomak Lake 155 AB 812 yes yes yes no yes
4817837 John d'Or Prairie 215 AB 851 - - - - -
5909832 Seabird Island BC 535 yes yes no yes yes
5909839 Chehalis 5 BC 460 yes yes no no yes
5915803 Musqueam 2 BC 1305 yes yes no yes no
5915807 Mission 1 BC 550 no no no yes no
5915808 Capilano 5 BC 2230 - - - - -
5919804 Chemainus 13 BC 557 yes yes no yes no
5919807 Cowichan 1 BC 1201 yes yes no yes no
5923816 Tsahaheh 1 BC 322 yes yes no yes no
5929803 Sechelt (Part) BC - no yes no no no
5933880 Kamloops 1 BC 1410 yes yes yes yes no
5937801 Okanagan (Part) 1 BC 95 no yes no yes yes
5941801 Alkali Lake 1 BC 396 yes yes yes yes yes
5941812 Williams Lake 1 BC 273 no yes no yes yes
5943801 Alert Bay 1 BC 281 - - - - -
5943802 Alert Bay 1A BC 411 yes yes no yes no
5943806 Tsulquate 4 BC 387 no no yes no no
5949803 Kitamaat 2 BC 511 yes yes yes yes yes
5949811 Hagwilget 1 BC 237 no yes no yes yes
5949812 Gitanmaax 1 BC 693 yes yes no yes yes
5949814 Gitsegukla 1 BC 432 yes yes no yes yes
5949816 Gitwangak 1 BC 475 yes yes no yes yes
5955801 East Moberly Lake 169 BC 330 yes yes no no no
5959806 Fort Nelson 2 BC 390 yes yes yes yes no
Community facility information and population sizes found at Aboriginal Canada Portal:
http://www.aboriginalcanada.gc.ca/acp/site.nsf/eng/index.html. F.N. stands for First Nation.
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